We document and investigate the egocentric impact bias-the perception that the social effects of the self's actions will be affectively stronger than if those same effects were brought about by others. In Study 1, participants thought pleasant or aversive videos would elicit stronger reactions when participants themselves (instead of the random determination of a computer) selected the video for others. In Study 2, participants who considered how to divide (vs. how a computer would randomly split) $10 with another thought the other would react particularly positively or negatively to the self's particularly generous or stingy allocations, respectively. The two studies found support for one of two possible mechanistic accounts. When the self was responsible for the selection, it experienced the stimuli as more affectively intense, thus explaining the bias. It was not the case that all intentional agents (e.g., another participant) were assumed to have more affective impact.
peers'-are likely to be realized (Helzer & Dunning, 2012) . We extend on this portrait of the self as especially influential by asking whether it sees its social actions as having an especially strong affective impact, a phenomenon we call the egocentric impact bias (EIB).
We consider two potential sources of the EIB. By the intentionality hypothesis, people assume intentional actions produce amplified reactions in others. Such perceptions may be true.
For example, Gray and Wegner (2008) found that human-delivered shocks produced greater pain than comparable computer-administered ones. If people intuit this effect, they may assume that the self's, as well as any other's, intentional actions will produce more affect.
By a different account, the self's psychological proximity to its own actions leads them to feel affectively stronger. The emotion regulation literature is replete with examples of how distancing oneself from a stimulus-by reconstruing it from a third-person perspective (Kross & Ayduk, 2008; Leitner, Ayduk, Mendoza-Denton, Magerman, Amey, Kross, & Forbes, 2017) , pretending it is hypothetical (McRae, Ciesielski, & Gross, 2012) , or literally moving away from it (Gable, Reis, & Elliot, 2000) -makes it less evocative. Such relationships are often exploited to help people dampen their emotions (Kross & Ayduk, 2008) . But by our self-proximity hypothesis, the self's closeness to its own actions amplifies its own responses to them. Because the self uses its own responses as a guide in estimating how others will feel (Van Boven & Loewenstein, 2003) , this tendency to project will lead the self to exaggerate its affective influence on others.
Study 1
In Study 1, participants predicted others' reactions to a pleasant or aversive slideshow.
Both the intentionality and self-proximity hypotheses anticipate the slideshows will be assumed to evoke more affect if the self chooses them. Only the self-proximity hypothesis predicts the self's own stronger responses-when the self is the active chooser and not a passive observerto the stimuli will mediate such effects.
Method
Participants and design. Given a desire to maximize statistical power, but lacking knowledge of the true effect size of the EIB, we did not know how many participants would be necessary to achieve adequate power. Instead, we took several steps to maximize power. First, we recruited participants from two samples simultaneously, given our access to both samples (an undergraduate subject pool at the University of California, Berkeley, and Amazon Mechanical Turk) and knowledge that we would achieve greater statistical power through the larger sample size that leaning on both participant populations permitted. Second, we wanted to well exceed Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn's (2013) rough guideline that sample sizes under fifty participants are suspect. Procedures were approved under the "Emotional Responsibility Effect" protocol (#2015-09-7996). We recruited as many participants through the undergraduate subject pool as we had access to in one semester (n = 164) and as many participants through Mechanical Turk as the funding lab's monthly budget would permit (n = 159). Third, where feasible, we leaned on within-subjects manipulations that would allow us to increase statistical power (under the assumption that participants' multiple responses would be correlated).
We used a 2(decider: self or computer) X 2(valence: positive or negative) mixed design.
Only the first factor was manipulated between-subjects. We recruited 323 participants. Fortynine participants were unable to pass an attention check-a simple multiple-choice question asking what they had done in the study-and were excluded from all analyses. The details of this attention check as well as all analyses without exclusions are reported in the Supplemental
Materials.
Procedure. At the start of the experiment, participants were taken to a loading page where they were told they would wait up to 60 seconds, ostensibly to be paired with another participant. After 10 seconds of seeing a page-loading gif (to reinforce the cover story), participants were told they had been successfully matched with another participant. The two participants would supposedly complete two tasks in the opposite order. This explained why participants would be watching the key slideshows before the other participant and sometimes selecting which the other would watch.
We created 4 brief slideshows. Each slideshow contained 6 images from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) that were each displayed for 3 seconds; thus, each presentation lasted 18 seconds. Two slideshows were positive in valence and were matched on thematic content and average arousal (Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1997) : They each contained baby animals, children, and images of people engaging in fun activities. The other two were negative in valence and were also matched on content and average arousal. They each contained children with disfigurements, images of deceased animals and people, and a person persecuting others.
All participants knew the yoked other (the recipient) would watch only two of the four slideshows-one positive and one negative. What we varied by condition was how those two slideshows would be chosen. When the self was the decider, the self would select which positive video and which negative video the other would have to watch. But when the computer was the decider, the selection of positive and negative video the yoked participant would watch would be randomly determined. Participants learned these procedures before the videos began.
Participants watched the positive videos and the negative videos in a counterbalanced order. The sequencing of the two slideshows within each pair was also counterbalanced.
Following each video, participants rated how the yoked recipient would feel after watching that video that the self or computer might choose for the recipient (depending on the condition).
Participants indicated their forecasts on eight 101-point slider scales (from 0 = not at all to 100 = most I have ever felt) that measured negatively valenced emotions (angry, disgusted, anxious, guilty) or positively valenced emotions (amused, happy, proud, loving) . To help us distinguish the intentionality and self-proximity hypotheses, participants also reported their own emotional reactions to the videos using the same scales.
Results
We began by testing for the emotional impact bias -i.e., whether the stimuli were forecast to produce a stronger response in another if they were provided by the self. Toward this end, we created two new variables: recipient emotional impact and self emotional impact. For each video, we took the average of the congruent emotional responses (positive [negative] emotions for the positive [negative] slideshows) and subtracted off the incongruent emotional responses (e.g., negative [positive] emotions for the positive [negative] slideshows). To understand whether the decider manipulation changed participants' social forecasts and/or their own experience, we used 2(decider: self or computer) X 2(valence: positive or negative) mixed ANOVAs, with only the second factor measured within-subjects.
Recipient emotional impact. When the self (instead of a computer) would decide what the recipient would view, the options were assumed to produce more of an emotional impact.
That is, those considering which to send the other estimated the slideshows would evoke a stronger emotional response (M = 47.78, SE = 1.57) than those told a computer would make the assignment (M = 41.87, SE = 1.61), F(1, 272) = 6.91, p = .009, ηp 2 = .025 (see Figure 1 ). This effect did not differ depending on the valence of the video, F(1, 272) = 1.93, p = .166, ηp 2 = .007. Although these results support the EIB, we moved to analyses of self emotional impact to begin disentangling our two theoretical accounts.
Did the self's own emotional response explain the egocentric impact bias?
We submitted the self's emotional impact scores to the same model. Participants who would be the deciders themselves experienced the stimuli as more emotionally intense (M = 45.30, SE = 1.77) than those told the computer would decide (M = 37.81, SE = 1.82), F(1, 272) = 8.71, p = .003, ηp 2 = .031. Did deciders' own amplified experience guide their forecasts of the impact these stimuli would have on recipients? We added the self's emotional impact scores to our initial mixed model and included a random effect of participant. Consistent with the idea that self deciders' own elevated emotional experience was projected onto recipients, we observed a significant effect of self emotional impact, t(539.86) = 46.30, p < .001. With the self emotional impact controlled, the EIB disappeared, t(267.14) = 0.33, p = .740. A significant Sobel test provided evidence consistent with full mediation, z = 2.95, p = .003.
In summary, those who were deciding themselves what emotionally laden stimuli to impose upon another (vs. those who knew a computer would do the same) experienced those stimuli as more emotionally impactful, which explained why they estimated that the recipients would find them more emotionally impactful. Only the self-proximity hypothesis anticipates the mediating role of the self's own experience. The intentionality hypothesis predicts only that people intuit that intentional actions will produce more emotionally impactful responses. To determine whether the intentionality account also contributes to the EIB, Study 2 examines whether intentional agents other than the self are assumed to have a greater emotional impact on others.
Study 2
Study 2 extends Study 1 in three ways. First, we used a dictator game paradigm. Second we added an other condition in which another person was an intentional decider. Only the selfproximity hypothesis predicts that their allocations will not be seen to have the emotional impact the self's will. Third, we told participants that their yoked recipient would always be told a computer determined their allocations. Such recipient ignorance was implicit in Study 1, but was made explicit in Study 2.
Method
Participants and design. Guided by the same rules laid out in Study 1, we sought to achieve a large sample size by recruiting participants simultaneously from Amazon's Mechanical Turk (n = 281) and an undergraduate subject pool (n = 307). Whereas AMT participants were paid a nominal amount, undergraduate participants received course credit. These 588 participants were randomly assigned to one of three decider conditions: self, other, or computer.
Procedure. As in Study 1, we began by leading participants to a loading page where they were to wait up to 60 seconds while they were ostensibly paired with one (self and computer conditions) or two (other condition) other participants. After 10 seconds, participants were told that this pairing had occurred. All participants then learned about a $10 pot that would be split between two people. How that split would be determined and which two participants would receive the money varied by condition.
Those in the self decider condition learned they would determine how much of the money to give another participant, the recipient, thereby leaving the remainder for themselves. Those in the computer condition were also told that the $10 would be split between themselves and another participant, the recipient, but learned that a computer would randomly determine the allocation. Those in the other condition-who learned they had been yoked to two others, a decider and a recipient-were told the decider would decide how much of the $10 to give the recipient. To parallel the self condition, participants in this condition were told their own financial outcome would match that of the decider.
In all conditions participants considered how the recipient would feel if that person were to receive a specified amount of the $10: $10, $5, $1, or $0.01. Although how the allocation was said to be determined varied by condition, the recipient was said to always be told that the allocation would be determined randomly by a computer. For each amount, participants provided an estimate of the recipient's emotional reaction on eight dimensions: contented, pleased, satisfied, happy, cheated, disappointed, upset, and frustrated. Each judgment was made on a 101point scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 100 (most they have ever felt). After reverse scoring the final four (negative) emotional reactions, we averaged the items to create a recipient (positive) emotional impact score (α = .87).
Results
We sought to test whether the allocation's assumed emotional impact depended on who would decide that allocation. Toward that end we created a new variable, allocation. This reflected the monetary value received by the recipient: $10 (+3), $5 (+1), $1 (-1), and $0.01 (-3).
Although we are not committed to the idea that the assumed emotional impact across these levels would be perfectly linear, we used these codes to capture the hypothesized monotonic relationship.
We conducted a mixed model in which we included fixed effects of allocation and decider condition (self, other, or computer). To account for the non-independence of participants' multiple judgments, we included a random effect of participant. Unsurprisingly, we observed a strong effect of allocation, F(1, 2345) = 2,915.24, p < .001. This reflected that participants assumed that recipients would grow more pleased as their allocation increased. But more central to our hypotheses, we also observed a Role X Allocation interaction, F(2, 2345) =15.92, p < .001 (see Figure 2 ). We proceeded to decompose this interaction into a series of 2(Role) X Allocation interactions.
First, a significant 2(Decider: self vs. computer) X Allocation interaction, t(2345) = 5.44, p < .001, conceptually replicated Study 1. That is, participants thought they would have a larger impact on recipients' emotional state if they themselves, as opposed to a computer, decided on the allocation. But was this because intentional agents are estimated to have more emotional impact (intentionality hypothesis), or because the self's actions in particular are assumed to have more emotional influence (self-proximity hypothesis)? Supporting the latter possibility, we observed a significant 2 (Decider: self vs. other) X Allocation interaction, t(2345) = 4.05, p < .001. We did not observe a significant 2(Decider: other vs. computer) X Allocation interaction, t(2345) = 1.41, p = .158. In summary, the EIB emerges not because intentional acts are assumed to produce more emotional impact, but because the self in particular is accorded this power.
General Discussion
Two studies provided support for the EIB: The self anticipated that its own actions would have a stronger emotional impact on others than would identical actions by another, even another intentional agent. As a proximal participant in such choices, the self experienced the stimuli it might choose for another as particularly emotionally evocative. The self's own heightened reaction was then projected onto the other. Gray and Wegner (2009) suggest social perceptions involve moral typecasting-seeing moral agents as agentic and moral patients as emotionally sensitive. The EIB suggests that when the self is the agent, it tends to typecast, seeing the patient as emotional. But crucially, typecast roles are mutually exclusive. One implication is the self may see those it acts upon as particularly non-agentic. Such perceptions of passivity may embolden the self to meddle more than observers would think reasonable, an implication of the EIB that awaits future test.
Finally, the EIB might even be functional-encouraging good deeds and discouraging bad ones. How might humans bring themselves to commit heinous acts of violence? One route is by assigning such acts to other agents, which Study 2 suggests may lessen the perceived suffering such acts will cause. Another possibility is the EIB may underlie the dehumanization of victims (Leyens, Paladino, Rodriguez-Torres, Vaes, Demoulin, Rodriguez-Perez, & Gaunt, 2000) : Instead of being dissuaded from atrocities by the EIB, transgressors may reconstrue their targets as subhuman to avoid such guilt. Ultimately, harnessing the EIB may encourage prosociality. Figure 1 . Study 1-Predicted emotional impact on the recipient as a function of the decider and the stimulus valence. Higher values reflect a prediction that the recipient will respond more positively (vs. negatively) to the positive stimuli and more negatively (vs. positively) to the negative stimuli. All error bars reflect ±1 standard error of the mean. 
